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AN ANDY WARHOL SOCIETY - FIRST COCA-
COLA, NOW HUMANS: AN EXAMINATION OF




The idea of human cloning is repulsive to many people. The
thought of replicating a person conjures up images from science
fiction movies involving strange mutants and creatures. This
power is in the hands of mankind, and many are afraid of how it
will be used. The fear stems from talk of using a cloned human
for spare body parts, replacing a child that has died, and even
recreating and raising oneself or one's mother or father as a
child.' The rights of the cloned human and the psychological
implications of both parent and clone become serious issues.
Proponents sometimes criticize those who oppose human
cloning as merely doing so based on ethical feelings, without
giving substantive explanations. 2 Of course, a discussion of
* Class of 2001, St. John's University School of Law.
I See Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans
on Human Cloning, 11 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 643, 647-49 (1998) (discussing these abilities as desirable). See generally
Leon R. Kass, Thiumph or Tragedy? The Moral Meaning of Genetic Technology, 45 AM. J.
JURIs. 1, 1-3 (2000) (discussing how far scientists have come with gene therapy);
Katheryn D. Katz, The Clonal Child" Procreative Liberty and Asexual Reproduction, 8
ALB. L.J. Sc. & TECH. 1, 3-15 (1997) (discussing controversy surrounding human
cloning).
2 See Lawrence Wu, Family Planning Through Human Cloning: Is There a
Fundamental Rgbt?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1461 (1998) (arguing ethical
considerations are immaterial because they overstate concerns). See generally Noelle
Lenoir, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights: The First Legal
and Ethical Framework at the Global Level, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 537, 537-49
(1999) (outlining bioethic laws which have stemmed from moral concerns). But see,
Symposium, Gene Therapy:. Legal, Financial and Ethical Issues, 4 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L.
3, 4-5 (1997) (cautioning history teaches us that technology can be used for both good and
evil).
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cloning necessarily involves moral and ethical considerations, as
this is the ultimate reason for the immediate repugnancy many
people feel. The fear is that this ultimate power placed in the
hands of anyone desiring to clone is unnatural and will be
misused. Indeed, many reasons forwarded for allowing cloning
appear to be misuses in and of themselves. 3
Few arguments appear valid to allow cloning. One argument
stands out above the rest and requires further examination. It
has the potential for providing a legal basis for allowing cloning
and cloning research to continue on humans. This argument is
founded in the Constitution and the question becomes: whether
there is a constitutional right to clone based on the fundamental
right to have children.4 This paper will examine the development
of the fundamental right to procreate and will decide whether
this fundamental right applies to human cloning, which would
result in a constitutionally protected right to clone. The legal
arguments surrounding human cloning will be discussed,
including an analysis of the various state interests involved in
preventing the cloning of humans for reasons of procreation and
whether these interests are compelling enough to ban human
cloning.
II. CLONING PROCEDURES
Cloning is the process by which biological material, including
genes or cells, is duplicated5 Molecular, cellular, and nuclear
3 See Andrews, supra note 1, at 64749 (discussing reasons for human cloning). See
generally Symposium, supra note 2, at 3-15 (1997) (discussing possibility cloning may be
used for evil purposes); Jane Lampman, Clozing's Double Trouble, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Aug. 13, 1998, at B1 (arguing human cloning poses deep religious and moral
questions).
4 This paper is limited to the discussion of human cloning as protected under the right
to privacy. See Wu, supra note 2, at 1461 (arguing married couples have fundamental
right to procreate through human cloning). See generally Weldon E. Havins & James J.
Dalessio, The Ever-Widening Gap Between the Science of Artifcial Reproductive
Technology and the Laws Which Govern that Technology, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 825, 829-32
(1999) (discussing Constitutional protections of procreation); Matthew B. Hsu, Banning
Human Cloning: An Acceptable Limit on Scientific Inquiry or an Unconstitutional
Restriction ofSymbolic Speech?, 87 GEO. L.J. 2399, 2400 (1999) (examining prohibition of
human cloning as possible First Amendment violation).
5 See Cloning Human Beings, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 1 CLONING
HUMAN BEINGS 1, 13-38 (1997) (discussing process of cloning); Cow/Human Embryonic
Stem Cell Produced, APPLIED GENETIC NEWS, Dec., 1998 Bioprocessing Vol. 19, No. 5
(reporting method discovered for production of primitive human embryonic stem cells).
See generally UK Legalizes Human Cloning, APPLIED GENETIC NEWS, Feb., 2001 Cell
Therapy Vol. 21, No. 7 (discussing uses of creating cloned human embryos).
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transplantation are the three types of cloning procedures
currently available to scientists.6 Molecular cloning involves the
copying of DNA fragments that contain genes to be grown in a
host cell. 7  This type of cloning is used mainly for DNA
technology and research. With cellular cloning, cells are copied
from the body and grown in a laboratory.8 These techniques are
used for medical advances, such as producing insulin for
diabetics. 9 Both are reliable procedures, but neither have the
ability to produce embryos because they do not involve the use of
egg or sperm. They would not, therefore, be used to clone human
beings.'O
Somatic cell nuclear transfer, or nuclear transplantation,
involves reproducing the entire genetic code, rather than just
DNA fragments or cells.11 This process was used by Scottish
6 See Cloning Human Beings, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 1 CLONING
HUMAN BEINGS, at 13; see also Gregory J. Rokosz, Human Cloning. Is the Reach of the
FDA Authority Too Far a Stretch, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 464, 471-78 (2000) (discussing
science of cloning techniques). See generally Multigenerational Mouse Clones Revive
Human Replication Talk, BIOWORLD TODAY, July 24, 1998 (reporting new technique used
to clone more than 50 mice).
7 See Cloning Human Beings, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 1 CLONING
HUMAN BEINGS, at 14 (stating that molecular cloning is simplest type of cloning). See
generally N. Omori, et al., Molecular Cloning of Rat CD34 CDNA and Expression During
Stem Cell Dependent Liver Regeneration, CANCER WEEKLY PLUS, May 5, 1997, at 35
(examining expressions of CD34 on hepatic stem cell progeny); Method For Molecular
Cloning and Polynucleotide Synthesis Using Vaccinia DNA Topoisomerase,
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Oct. 21, 1996, at 7 (discussing method of molecular
cloning).
8 See Cloning Human Beings, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 1 CLONING
HUMAN BEINGS, at 14 (describing cellular cloning). See generally N. Guillen, et al.,
Stabilized Non-Complementing Diploids From Fused Protoplast Products of B. Subtilis,
EMBO J., May 4, 1985, at 1333-8 (reporting experiment using cellular cloning); House
Hearing Focuses on How to Ban Human Cloning, TRANSPLANT NEWS, Feb. 28, 1998
(describing fight over cellular cloning research).
9 See Cloning Human Beings, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 1 CLONING
HUMAN BEINGS, at 14 (describing medical advances made through cellular cloning). See
generally Craig M. Borowski, Human Cloning Research in Japan: A Study in Science,
Culture, Moralit, and Patent Law, 9 IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 505, 509-13 (1999)
(describing history of cellular cloning); Shannon H. Smith, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Why a
Ban on Human Cloning is Unacceptable, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 311, 314 (1999) (describing
parameters of cellular cloning).
10 See Cloning Human Beings, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 1 CLONING
HUMAN BEINGS, at 14 (reporting that cellular cloning and molecular cloning do not
involve use of egg or sperm). See generally Borowski, supra note 9, at 511-12 (describing
the absence of egg and sperm from molecular and cellular cloning); Smith, supra note 9,
at 314 (same).
II See Cloning Human Beings, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 1 CLONING
HUMAN BEINGS, at 13 (describing process of somatic cell nuclear transfer). See generally
Kenton Abel, Biotechnology and Medical Devices, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 465, 468-69
(1998) (describing somatic cell nuclear transfer); Katz, supra note 1, at 6-9 (outlining
Congress' approach to use of somatic cell nuclear transfer in creation of children).
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scientist Ian Wilmut, to create the sheep Dolly, the first adult
mammal to be successfully cloned.12 Prior to this, Dr. John
Gurdon cloned a frog in the 1970s, the first clone to be reported.' 3
The frog cells were larger and easier to handle than the cells of
mammals, though the frogs never matured beyond tadpoles. 14
Nuclear transplantation is the process that threatens to
artificially replicate a human being.'5 This procedure was
developed in the early 1980s. The cells used in this technique
must be somatic, which include any cell except that of a germ.16
Once donor cells are obtained, the genetic material is isolated
and inserted into the nucleus of a recipient egg cell of which the
genetic material has been destroyed.17 This transfer produces an
egg that has complete genetic material, identical to that of the
donor. The egg is then fused and activated by electrofusion,
where a pulse of electric current stimulates the development of
the egg.18 Finally, it is implanted into the uterus of a surrogate,
using in vitro fertilization.19 If the growth and development are
successful, the result is a genetic replica of the donor.20
12 See Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act, H.R. REP. NO. 105-239, at 2 (1997)
(noting creation of "Dolly" through somatic cell transfer); Abel, supra note 11, at 465-69
(describing creation of "Dolly" through somatic cell nuclear transfer). See generally Mary
B. Mahowald, Genes, Clones, and Gender Equality, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 495,
passim (2000) (describing one facet of debate over somatic cell nuclear transfer).
13 See Smith, supra note 9, at 311 (reporting first cloning); see also Michael I. Kahn,
Public Policy: Clowning Around With Clones: The Moral and Legal Implications of
Human Cloning, 3 U.S.F. J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 161, 163 (1999) (reporting J. Gurdon
cloned toads from tadpole).
14 See Smith, supra note 9, at 311 (describing result of frog cloning); see also Kahn,
supra note 13, at 163 (describing J. Gurdon's work in cloning frog).
15 See Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act, H.R. REP. No. 105-239, at 2 (stating
nuclear transplantation is new cloning technique which raises prospect of human
cloning); see also Jennifer Cannon and Michelle Haas, The Human Cloning Prohibition
Act: Did Congress Go Too FarZ 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 637, 637 (describing human
cloning as modem possibility).
16 See Cloning Human Beings, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 1 CLONING
HUMAN BEINGS, at appendix 3 (identifying somatic cells).
17 See Cloning Human Beings, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 1 CLONING
HUMAN BEINGS, at 13 (discussing process of nuclear tranplantation); Hsu, supra note 4, at
2401 (describing nuclear transplatation); see also Human Cloning Research Prohibition
Act, H.R. REP. No. 105-239, at 1 (outling nuclear transplantation process).
See Cloning Human Beings, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 1 CLONING HUMAN
BEINGS, at 13 (describing nuclear tranplantation process); Smith, supra note 9, at 315-16
(same).
19 See Cloning Human Beings, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 1 CLONING
HUMAN BEINGS, at appendix
20 See id. at 14 (noting unlike previous experiments, Dolly had the genetic material of
only one parent).
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III. LEGAL STATUS OF HUMAN CLONING
When news of Dolly spread after the announcement on
February 23, 1997,21 there was great public outcry against the
cloning of humans.22 Nine days later, President Clinton initiated
a moratorium on federal funding of cloning research and
proposed a voluntary moratorium on private funding, as well.23
The President authorized the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission (NBAC) to examine the implications of human
cloning.24 The NBAC's report recommended the continuation of
the moratorium on the use of federal funding to produce a human
clone by nuclear transplantation and subsequent in vitro
fertilization.25 The Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act is
the federal bill that currently prohibits the use of federal funds to
further such research on human cloning. The moratorium is
currently in effect for five years until 2002, while proposed
federal legislation that would place a permanent ban on the
cloning of human beings is pending.26
Some states have also passed legislation banning human
cloning and related research. 27 California was the first to enact
such a law.28 Other states followed and much new legislation has
21 See Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act, H.R. REP. NO. 105-239, at 2
(explaining on February 23, 1997, The Observer broke the international news an
embryologist in Scotland had successfully cloned a sheep).
22 See Cannon and Haas, supra note 15, at 637 (noting news of Dolly grabbed
attention of President, Congress, and American public).
23 See H.R. REP. No. 105-239, at 2 (stating in February 1997, Clinton issued executive
order disallowing federal funding for cloning human beings).
24 See id. at 2 (affirming NBAC issued report in June 1997 with several
recommendations).
25 See id. at 2 (specifying somatic cell nuclear transfers should not be used to produce
any products for later in vitro fertilization into woman's womb); see also Fahd Riaz,
Genetic Transplantation Cloning And Federal Legislation: Some Constitutional Issues,7
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 421, 425 (2001) (recommending adoption of federal legislation that
banned somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning to create humans).
26 See H.R. REP. No. 105-239, at 8 (providing review by National Research Council on
impact of this Act upon research to be completed five years after date of enactment of
Act).
27 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2260.5 (Deering 2001) (establishing violation of
human cloning prohibition constitutes unprofessional conduct); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 24185 (Deering 2001) (prohibiting human cloning and operative until January 1,
2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §1299.36.2 (West 2001) (prohibiting human cloning, but
excluding scientific research and cell based therapy, and imposing maximum $10 million
fine or ten years imprisonment); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §750.430(a) (West 2001)
(banning human cloning except for scientific research and cell based therapies); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §23-16.4-2 (1999) (prohibiting human cloning for purpose of creating humans).
28 See Kenton Abel, 1997 California Legislative Service 688 (West) Human Cloning,
13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 465, 470 (1998) (indicating California was first state to enact
2002]
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been proposed. 29 Problems with the drafting of the bills are
evident, however, and many are vague, inconsistent, and
unclear.30 New York's proposed legislation even goes so far as to
impose civil fines; create grounds for license revocation if public
funds are used; and make human cloning, for reasons other than
medical or scientific research, a class D felony.31
Several countries are also taking measures to ban human
cloning. Germany, Denmark, Australia, Spain, and the United
Kingdom, have already enacted or proposed laws prohibiting
cloning.32 Other countries, such as France, Argentina, China,
moratorium on human cloning after announcement of Dolly).
29 See S.R. 292, 91st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2000) (calling for report on human
cloning); S.B. 649, 91,1 General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1999) (prohibiting human
cloning with exceptions for certain medical research until January 1, 2005); S.B. 1394,
181st General Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999) (prohibiting human cloning); S.B. 1689, 224"'
Annual Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001) (prohibiting human cloning through nuclear
transplantation, except for scientific research for diseases or cures, and establishes
human cloning as class D felony); A.B. 8341, 222nd Annual Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999)
(imposing $250 fine for violating prohibition on human cloning); A.B. 6874, 222n d Annual
Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (making violation of human cloning prohibition grounds for license
revocation); S.B. 1954, 222"d Annual Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (imposing civil fine for human
cloning); A.B. 3026, 222nd Annual Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (prohibiting sale of ovum, zygote,
embryo, or fetus for purpose of human cloning and establishing civil penalties); S.B. 1179,
222nd Annual Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (prohibiting sale of ovum, zygote, embryo, or fetus for
purpose of human cloning and establishing civil penalties); S.B. 102, 123"' General
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999) (prohibiting human cloning for five years after effective
date of prohibition); S.B. 794, 70 t ' Leg. Assem., (Or. 1999) (creating moratorium on
human cloning).
30 See Abel, supra note 28, at 480 (asserting constitutionality of state legislative bills
will depend upon how carefully they are drafted); see also Cannon and Haas, supra note
15, at 638 (noting language of federal ban is vague); Lori Andrews, et al. Cloning Position
Paper of the IIT Institute for Science, Law and Technology Working Group on
Reproductive Technologies 8 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 87 (noting much of proposed
legislation suffers from drafting infirmities, some state bills create loopholes by only
prohibiting creation of "genetically identical" individuals through cloning).
31 See S.B. 6538, 223"' Annual Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2000) (prohibiting human cloning
through nuclear
transplantation, except for scientific research for diseases or cures, and establishes
human cloning as class D felony);
A.B. 8341, 222nd Annual Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (imposing $250 fine for violating
prohibition on human
cloning); A.B. 6874, 222nd Annual Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (making violation of human
cloning prohibition grounds for license revocation); S.B. 1954, 222nd Annual Leg. Sess.
(N.Y. 1999) (imposing civil fine for human cloning); A.B. 3026, 222"d Annual Leg. Sess.
(N.Y. 1999) (prohibiting sale of ovum, zygote, embryo, or fetus for purpose of human
cloning and establishing civil penalties); S.B. 1179, 222nd Annual Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999)
(prohibiting sale of ovum, zygote, embryo, or fetus for purpose of human cloning and
establishing civil penalties).
32 See H.R. REP. No. 105-239, at 2 (noting these countries are drafting or have drafted
prohibitions on human cloning); see also Heidi Forster, Legal Perspectives on Cloning:
Legal Responses to the Potential Cloning of Human Beings, 32 VAL. U.L. REV. 433,457-65
(discussing possible constitutional arguments if laws were passed to restrict creation of
children through somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning). But see Abel, supra note 28, at
[Vol. 16:245
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Japan, and the Council of Europe and World Health
Organization have demonstrated a desire to prevent the cloning
of humans.33 An international ban was supported by the United
States, Japan, Germany, England, France, Italy, and Canada, at
the G7 Summit of Economic Countries in June of 1997.34 Such
worldwide response is an indication of the intense concern and
apprehension that human cloning presents and the extreme
caution with which we must proceed.
IV. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROCREATE
Many Supreme Court decisions have led to the interpretation
that the right to decide whether or not to have children is
constitutionally protected by the fundamental right to privacy.
The Constitution does not specifically enumerate a right to
privacy. Griswold v. Connecticut35 was the first decision to
recognize a general privacy right.36 This case held that state
467 (explaining while many countries agree on idea of ban on cloning, there is division
among several European Union countries concerning proper means).
33 See H.R. REP. No. 105-239, at 2 (declaring intent of these countries to deter human
cloning efforts); see also Melissa K. Cantrell, International Response to Doll. Wll
Scientific Freedom Get Sheared, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 69, 72 (1998-99) (stating World
Medical Association, World Health Organization, and UNESCO were among many
international organizations who condemned human cloning). But see Nati Somekh, The
European Total Ban On Human Cloning. An Analysis Of The Council OfEurope 's Actions
In Promibiting Human Cloning, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J. 397, 398 (1999) (noting several
countries including Australia, United States, Canada, and Japan, have not signed
European treaty banning human cloning possibly because treaty proposes absolute ban on
human cloning as opposed to less restrictive legislative prohibition).
34 See H.R. REP. No. 105-239, at 2 (professing intent of these countries to propose
world-wide ban on human cloning); see also Anne Lawton, The Frankenstein Controversy
The Constitutional'ty of a Federal Ban on Cloning, 87 KY. L.J. 277, 280 (1998-99) (noting
in order to strike down federal cloning legislation as unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
must recognize cloning decisions as fundamental right and declare government's
countervailing interest in banning cloning technology is not compelling);
Valerie S. Rup, Human Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer Cloning, the Race to Regulate, and
the Constitutionality of the Proposed Regulations, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1135, 1137
(1999) (noting many of proposed state laws are arguably unconstitutional based on First
Amendment and Due Process Clause of either Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments).
35 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (discussing several rights included in "penumbra" of right to
privacy). See generally Kenneth Pimple, Regious, Philosophical, and Ethical
Perspectives On Cloning. The Ethics of Human Cloning and the Fate of Science in a
Democratic Society, 32 VAL. U.L. REV. 727, 735 (1998) (discussing JAMA article which
comments on "complexity of the ethical and legal issues related to reproduction, genetic
manipulation, [and] rights to privacy," and notes 'Wilmut and many other investigators
have few objections to laws forbidding the actual cloning of a human being).
36 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-86 (examining some important rights found under First
Amendment, but also some rights not specifically delineated in Constitutional text
including right to educate one's child as one chooses (Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925)) and right to study German in a private school (Meyer v. State of Nebraska,
2002]
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laws preventing the use and distribution of contraceptives are
unconstitutional because they intrude on the right to marital
privacy. 37 In finding a right to marital privacy, the Court stated
there is a general zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees. 38 The Court held a general right to
privacy exists and this right is evidenced by certain amendments.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court examined general privacy
interests in the First, 39 Third,40 Fourth,41 Fifth,42 Ninth,43 and
Fourteenth 44 Amendments.45
262 U.S. 390 (1923)), and stating that these cases establish right of a parent to be free
from government interference in raising his or her child); Elizabeth Price Foley, The
Constitutional Implications of Human Cloning, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 694 (2000)
(specifying within Griswold dicta, Seventh Circuit noted that "the rights to marry and to
procreate biologically are older than any state law and, for that matter, older than the
Constitution or the Bill of Rights).
37 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (stating present case concerns relationships lying
within zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees); see also
Andrews, supra note 1, at 664 (discussing possible existence of fundamental right to clone
and noting right to make decisions about whether or not to bear children is
constitutionally protected under constitutional right to privacy and constitutional right to
liberty).
38 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. See also Charlene Kalebic, Symposium on Cloning.
The Constitutional Question of Cloning Humans: Duplication or Procreation? An
Examination of the Constitutional Riglht to Procreate 8 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 229, 239
(1998) (citing Roe v. Wade as holding activities relating to family and procreation fall
within definition of fundamental right to privacy).
39 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Katz, supra note 1, at 45 (noting religious groups
argue that restrictions on right of procreative freedom invade religious liberties protected
by Free Exercise Clause of First Amendment).
40 U.S. CONST. amend. III. See generallyKimberly M. Jackson, Well, Hello Dolly! The
Advent of Cloning Legislation and its Constitutional Implications, 52 SMU L. REV. 283
(1999) (discussing legal ramifications of bans on cloning).
41 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See generally Paul Tully: Dollywood is Not Just a Theme
Park in Tennessee Anymore: Un warrented Prohibitory Human Cloning Legislation and
Policy Guidelines for a Regulatory Approach To Cloning, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1385
(1998) (discussing public policy issues enumerated by reproductive experts speaking at
preliminary hearings).
42 U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally David Orentlicher, Cloning and the
Preservation of Family Integrity,
59 LA. L. REV. 1019 (1999) (stating it is too early to conclude that cloning can be
performed without putting children that result at undue risk of harm as children of
cloning will have exactly same genetic material as their single genetic parent).
43 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."); see
also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (concluding that to deny privacy
rights would be equivalent to ignoring Ninth Amendment); Lisa Jane McGuire, Banking
on Biometrics: Your Bank's New High-Tech Method of Identication May Mean Giving
Up Your Privacy, 33 AKRON L. REV. 441, 459 (2000) (noting Court has recognized that
Ninth Amendment creates zone of privacy). See generally Gregory Allen, Ninth
Amendment and State Constitutional Ri'ghts, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1659, 1660-63 (1996)
(discussing meaning of Ninth Amendment).
44 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 ("Nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law"); see also Eileen L. McDonagh, My Body,
My Consent: Securing the Constitutional R'ght to Abortion Funding, 62 ALB. L. REV.
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The notion that a person has a fundamental right to make
decisions about procreation originated in Skinner v. State of
Oklahoma.46 This case involved the constitutionality of a state
statute that allowed sterilization of habitual criminals under the
theory that the offspring of a criminal would also be socially
undesirable. 47  The Supreme Court in Skinner, described
procreation as a basic liberty48 that is fundamental49 to our
existence and recognized that the statute deprive[d] certain
individuals of a right which is basic to the perpetuation of a race
- the right to have offspring.50 Although the Court arrived at its
1057, 1075 (1999) (noting many constitutional law scholars do not believe Fourteenth
Amendment requires state to protect individual's body and integrity). Compare Steven J.
Heyman, The First Duty of Government- Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1991 DUKE L.J. 507, 570-71 (1991) (arguing existence of basic obligation of
government to protect individual from violence).
45 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-86 (examining privacy interests in Bill of Rights); see
also David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a Right, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 7, 27-28 (1999) (critiquing Justice Douglas' use of phrase 'zone of privacy'). See
generally Samuel J. Levine, Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and Unenumerated
Biblical Oblgations: A Preliminary Study in Comparative Hermeneutics, 15 CONST.
COMMENT. 511, 519 (1998) (discussing Griswold in determining fundamental
constitutional guarantees). Compare John D.R. Craig, Invasion of Privacy and Charter
Values: The Common-Law Tort Awakens, 42 MCGILL L.J. 355, 369-70 (1997) (describing
notion of fundamental human right determined by Canadian Supreme Court).
46 See 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see also United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 78 (1971)
(Douglas, J. dissenting) (recognizing right to procreate). But see Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (rejecting claim that Skinner confers right of privacy in this
case).
47 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538-39 (1942) (finding violation of Equal Protections
Clause in statute which sterilizes one offender and not another when offenses are morally
indistinguishable); see also Jana Leslie-Miller, From Bell to Bell: Responsible
Reproduction in the Twentieth Century, 8 MD. J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 123, 132 (1997)
(noting that Skinner Court recognized potential devastating and far-reaching effects of
state's power to sterilize). Compare Stephanie Hyatt, A Shared History of Shame:
Sweden's Four-Decade Policy of Forced Sterilization and the Eugenics Movement in the
United States, 8 IND. INT'L & ComP. L. REV. 475, 488-89 (1998) (comparing coercive,
compulsive, involuntary sterilization in Sweden with eugenics movement in United
States).
48 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (finding basic liberty in right to procreate); see also
Reproductive Technology and the Procreation of the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669,
676 (1985) (arguing basic liberty at stake in Skinner is ability to procreate); Samuel
Gunsburg, Frozen Life's Dominion: Extending Reproductive Autonomy Rhghts to In Vitro
Fertilization, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2205, 2236-37 (1997) (discussing basic liberty right to
procreate through in vitro fertilization).
49 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (holding that procreation is fundamental right); see
also Kevin Aloysius Zambrowicz, "To Love and Honor All the Days of Your Life'" A
Constitutional Right to Same-Sex Marriage., 43 CATH. U.L. REV. 907, 913-14 (1994)
(discussing marriage as fundamental right as discussed in Skinner). Compare William M.
Hohengarten, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy, 103 YALE L.J. 1495, 1512
(1994) (distinguishing between mixed-race and same sex marriage in explaining
fundamental right to procreate).
50 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536 (finding right to procreate to be fundament right); see
also John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV.
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holding through an equal protection analysis, Skinner is
generally identified as the seminal case for establishing the right
to procreate. 51 This view is supported by the Supreme Court in
Eisenstadt v. Baird.52
Eisenstadt concerned a state statute prohibiting the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals.53 The
Court extended Griswold, when it held that a state may not
differentiate between persons on the basis of marital status when
regulating the distribution of birth control.54 In Eisenstadt, the
Court recognized that [ilf the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child.55
421, 427 (1996) (arguing pre-birth genetic selection should be permissible). Compare
Maura A- Ryan, Religious, Philosophical, and Ethical Perspectives on Cloning: Cloning,
Genetic Engineering, and the Limits of Procreative Liberty, 32 VAL. U.L. REV. 753, 756
(1998) (commenting that Court has not yet dealt with right to procreate in claims of
infertile person's right to noninterference).
51 See Wu, supra note 2, at 1475 (stating "the strongest precedent for establishing a
fundamental right to procreate is Skinnei"'); see also Mary Lynne Birck, Modern
Reproductive Technology and Motherhood: The Search for Common Ground and the
Recognition of Difference, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1623, 1627-28 (1994) (noting Supreme Court
has not addressed legality of surrogate arrangement or egg donation). See generally
Jennifer Marigliano Dehmel, To Have or Not to Have: Whose Reproductive Rights Prevail
in Disputes over Dispositions of Frozen Embryosv 27 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1379 (1995)
(recounting background of cases establishing right to procreate).
52 See 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding Massachusetts statute denying unmarried
individuals contraceptives unconstitutional); see also Katz, supra note 1, at 31
(questioning whether it is within government's power to curtail procreation). See
generally Kris W. Druim, A Welcome Return to Draconia: California Penal Law 645, the
Castration of Sex Offenders and the Constitution, 61 ALB. L. REV. 285, 320 (1997)
(discussing history of established right to procreate).
53 See 405 U.S. 438, 440-42 (holding Massachusetts statute violated rights of single
person under Fourteenth Amendment); see also Gwendolyn Prothro, RU 486 Examined:
Impact of New Technology on an Old Controversy, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 715, 719-720
(1997) (discussing legal standard used by Court to determine woman's right to use
contraception). Cf Lisa A. Hayden, Gender Discrimination within the Reproductive
Health Care System: Viagra v. Birth Control, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 171, 181-82 (1998-99)
(arguing men and women are not treated equally when it comes to sexual health care).
54 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453; see also Carey v. Population Services
International, 431 U.S. 678, 678 (1977) (extending constitutional protection to minors);
William Cohen, Is Equal Protection Like Oakland? Equality as Surrogate for Other
Rights, 59 TUL. L. REV. 884, 897 (1985) (arguing Skinner and Eisenstadt holdings avoided
addressing underlying issues of substantive due process and resulted in narrow
precedent). See generally David B. Cruz, "The Sexual Freedom Cases"? Contraception,
Abortion, Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 311 (2000)
(discussing constitutional right to choose to have abortion in wake of Eisenstadt).
55 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453; see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969) (noting fundamental right of privacy to be free from government intrusion); Irah H.
Donner, The R'ght To Privacy One Hundred Years Later Case Comment: Goodwin v.
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In the landmark case, Roe v. Wade,56 the Supreme Court
extended the right of privacy to include the right of a woman to
choose whether to have an abortion prior to viability of the
fetus.57 This case was decided on a general right to privacy
basis, 58 although it is sometimes discussed in the context of
individual autonomy and personal liberty of the Fourteenth
Amendment.5 9  Roe v. Wade advanced individual autonomy
aspects of the right to privacy.60 This may explain why the
misleading term procreative liberty is often used to describe the
right to procreate.61 Although it is labeled a liberty right, it
developed under the right to privacy through Griswold,62
Turner: Cons and Pro-Creating, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 999, 999 (1991) (noting Due
Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment protects individual's right to bear or beget
children); Panel Discussion: Contemporary Challenges to Privacy Rights, 43 N.Y. L. SCH.
L. REV. 195, 196 (1999) (discussing Justice Douglas' influence on Justice Brennan's
opinion).
56 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 113 (invalidating Texas law banning all abortions except for
life of mother); see also Edward Sylvester, Chenault v. Huie: Denying the Existence of a
Legal Duty Between a Mother and her Unborn Child, 33 AKRON L. REv. 107, 124 (1999)
(discussing right of privacy established by Roe). See generally McGuire, supra note 43 at
457-68 (discussing privacy protections under Federal Constitution and statutes).
57 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154-56 (discussing individual rights to privacy versus state
interests). See generally, Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 10 (1975) (stating woman's
right to abortion was unconstitutionally restricted by Texas statute); Terry Brantley,
People v. Kevorlan: Miclu'gan 's Supreme Court Leads the Way in Declaring No
Fundamental Rifht to Assist Another in Suicide, 47 MERCER L. REV. 1191, 1192-93 (1996)
(discussing right of privacy concerns and abortion privilege being applied to right to assist
in suicides).
58 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-56 (stating that right of privacy is "broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy").
59 See Gerald Gunther & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 538, 543 (13th ed.
1997) (stating interpretation of Roe is more narrow since Court discusses Fourteenth
Amendment as helping to provide basis for more general right to privacy). See generally
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed
Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 949, (1988) (stating Court
derived general right to privacy out of constitutional guarantee of liberty); Elizabeth A.
Reilly, The Rhetoric of Disrespect: Uncovering the Faulty Premises Infecting
Reproductive MRghts, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 147, 186 (1996) (stating
reproductive choices have rested on Supreme Court's recognition of general right of
privacy).
60 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-56 (extending prior general privacy right to autonomy
over body); Gunther & Sullivan, supra note 59, at 543; see also Christina L. Misner, Wat
If Mary Sue Wanted An Abortion Instead? The Effect of Davis v. Davis on Abortion
Rights, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 265, 270-71 (1995) (discussing possible
deterioration of personal autonomy and right to privacy established by Supreme Court).
61 See Clarke D. Forsythe, Human Cloning and the Constitution, 32 VAL. U. L. REV.
469, 513 (1998) (discussing "reproductive freedom" and "procreative liberty"); see also
Katz, supra note 1, at 44 (stating due to unclear Constitutional basis of procreative liberty
future of reproductive freedom may be in danger); John A. Robertson, Gestational
Burdens and Fetal Status: Justifying Roe v. Wade, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 189, 189 (1987)
(stating Roe recognized procreative liberty).
62 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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SkinneZ63 and Eisenstadt,64 as demonstrated above.
Another important Supreme Court decision, Carey v.
Population Services International,65 discussed a state law
preventing the sale or distribution of contraceptives to minors.
The Court, in holding that the law was unconstitutional, stated
that access to contraceptives is essential to exercise of the
constitutionally protected right of deciding matters of
childbearing, that is the underlying foundation of the holdings in
Gziswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe.66 The Court specifically
identified the right to procreate in its discussion of the existence
of a right to personal privacy.67 It stated that, "[wihile the outer
limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by the
Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may
make without unjustified government interference are personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing and education. "68
Finally, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey,69 the Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, and also
recognized the existence of a right to procreate.7 0 In discussing
Roe, the Court stated that subsequent constitutional
developments have neither disturbed, nor do they threaten to
diminish, the scope of recognized protection accorded to the
liberty relating to intimate relationships, the family, and
decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child.71
While public policy generally encourages traditional families,
an individual's privacy interest and freedom from unwarranted
governmental intrusion are held sacred. The preceding line of
63 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
64 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
65 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
66 See Carey, 431 U.S. at 687-89. See generally Pilar S. Ramos, The Condom
Controversy in the Publ'c Schools: Respecting a Minor's Right of Privacy, 145 U. PA. L.
REV. 149, 169-70 (1996) (discussing minor's right to privacy concerning contraception
decisions); Holly L. Robinson, Joint Custody: Constitutional Imperatives, 54 U. CIN. L.
REV. 27, 41-44 (1985) (discussing historical development of right to procreation decisions).
67 See Caney, 431 U.S. at 684-86 (explaining that right to personal privacy includes
right of procreation).
68 See Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 726-27).
69 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
70 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 857 (stating subsequent decisions of Supreme Court after
Roe "have neither disturbed, nor do they threaten to diminish the scope of recognized
protection accorded to the liberty relating to intimate relationships, the family, and
decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child.").
71 See id. at 857.
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cases shows the development and recognition of the right to
procreate.72 This right falls under the general right to privacy
and is, therefore, constitutionally protected.
V. HUMAN CLONING AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
It is first necessary to establish that human cloning is
considered a form of procreation before it can be discussed as
constitutionally protected. Procreation is defined as the
generation of children.73 Generate means to bring into existence,
cause to be, reproduce, procreate.7 4 Human cloning for purposes
of producing offspring is a form of procreation by its very process.
Human cloning is a common term used to describe somatic cell
nuclear transfer, or nuclear transplantation as described in Part
II above. This type of cloning is different from molecular cloning
and cellular cloning which are used for medical advances.7 5
Human cloning involves the process of replicating genetic
material for the purpose of producing an entire human.76 Once
the genetic material of an egg cell has been replaced, the egg is
placed in the woman's womb through in vitro fertilization and
she would then bear a child.77 Human cloning is a process by
72 See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992) (stating that
"procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal significance - the right to
procreate and the right to avoid procreation"); Andrea Michelle Siegel, Legal Resolution to
the Frozen Embryo, 4 J. PHARMACY & LAw 43, 51 (1994) (pointing to alternative position
recognizing interest in preembryo as property right enabling donor to exercise nearly
exclusive authority regarding its disposition); Misner, supra note 60, at 270 (stating
Supreme Court has limited states' power to either require or deny certain medical
treatment out of respect for individual's bodily integrity). But see Ruth Colker, Pregnant
Men Revisited or Sperm is Cheap, Eggs Are Not, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 1063,1065 (1996)
(declaring court in Davis v. Davis was incorrect in finding that men have constitutional
right to avoid procreation).
73 See BLACI S LAw DICTIONARY 1207 (6th ed. 1990).
74 See WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 590 (1989).
75 See Cloning Human Beings, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, available at
http/bioethics georgetown.edu nbacpubs/cloningllcloning.pdf (discussing ethical
concerns involved with such processes). Gregory Rokosz, Human Cloning:. Is the Reach of
FDA Authority Too Far a Stretch? (2000) 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 464, 475 (discussing
benefits and risks of molecular and cellular cloning). But see Shannon H. Smith,
Ignorance is Bliss: Why a Ban on Human Cloning Is Unacceptable, 9 HEALTH MATRIX
311, 314 (1999) (noting neither molecular nor cellular cloning are capable of allowing
development of clones into embryos).
76 See Cloning Human Beings, supra note 75 (describing medical processes involved).
But see Richard Perry, Broadening the Moral Conversation (A Response to Margaret
McLean) 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 351, 354 (2001) (arguing against ban on cloning because of
health benefits human cloning may provide).
77 See Cloning Human Beings, supra note 75, appendix A (defining cloning); see also
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which children may be generated, and in this sense, it is a form
of procreation.78
Currently there are no cases that discuss human cloning as
protected by procreative liberty,79 since it technically does not yet
exist.80 The procedure can, however, be discussed in light of its
relation to presently available assisted reproductive technologies,
such as artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization.81 An
examination of the way courts treat cases involving these
techniques sheds some light on how future cases regarding
Hsu, supra note 4, at 2401; Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act, H.R. REP. NO. 105-
239, at 1 (discussing ban on human cloning).
78 See Stephanie J. Hong, And "Cloning" Makes Three: A Constitutional Comparison
Between Cloning and Other Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 26 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 741, 743 (1999) (describing human cloning as "reproductive method"); Michael H.
Shapiro, I Want a Girl (Boy) Just Like the Girl (Boy) That Married Dear Old Dad (Mom):
Cloning Lives, 9 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L. J. 1, 26 (1999) (noting if source of clone is rearing
parent, no contradiction ensues in saying she is child's mother); Lee M. Silver & Susan
Remis Silver, Confused Heritage and the Absurdity of Genetic Ownership, 11 HARV. J.
LAw & TECH. 593, 603 (1998) (stating cloned children would be indistinguishable from all
other children by any biological test or criteria). But see Heidi Forster & Emily Ramsey,
Legal Perspectives on Cloning Legal Responses to the Potential Cloning of Human
Beings, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 433, 460 (1998) (pointing to arguments cloning is entirely new
means of creating person dissimilar from procreation and therefore not entitled to
constitutional protection).
79 See Sheils v. Univ. of Pa. Med. Ctr., No. 97-5510, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3918, at 5-6
(E.D. Pa. March 24, 1998) (finding a ban on human cloning constitutional and did not
infringe on individual's rights "to make reproductive choices free from Government
interference[,]" and stating court, however, dismissed case since plaintiffs did not allege
any actual or threatened enforcement of statute against them directly and in reaching
this conclusion, court cited Wheelerv. Travelers Insurance Co., 22 F.3d 534, 538 (3d Cir.
1994), to support that plaintiffs must assert their own legal interests, not those of third
party). See generally Stacy J. Ratner, Baa, Baa, Cloned Sheep, Have You Any Law?
Legislative Responses to Animal Cloning in the European Union and United States, 22
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 141, 150-51 (1999) (stating legislative response in both House
and Senate to news of successful cloning of sheep was almost immediate, proposing
prohibitions on use of federal funds for human cloning research); Susan Greenlee, Dollys
Legacy to Human Cloning" International Legal Responses and Potential Human Rights
Violations, 18 Wis. INT'L L. J. 537, 542 (2000) (reporting National Bioethics Advisory
Commission, at behest of President Clinton, filed report recommending continued ban on
federal funding of cloning research and requesting private sector compliance).
80 See Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act, H.R. REP. NO. 105-239, at 2 (stating
nuclear transplantation is new cloning technique that raises prospect of human cloning);
see also Jennifer Cannon & Michelle Haas, The Human Cloning Prolibition Act: Did
Congress Go Too Far? 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 637, 637 (1998) (describing human cloning
as modem possibility).
81 See Virginia Godoy, Where Is Biotechnology Taking the Law? An Overview of
Assisted Reproductive Technology, Research on Frozen Embryos and Human Cloning, 19
J. Juv. L. 357, 364 (1998) (discussing various assisted reproductive technologies); see also
Hong, supra note 78, at 788 (stating cloning of humans involves right to procreate and
would be protected by Supreme Court case law establishing right to privacy). But see
Andre P. Rose, Reproductive Misconception: Why Cloning Is Not Just Another Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 48 DuKE L. J. 1133, 1150 (1999) (arguing currently available
assisted reproductive technologies still require union of egg and sperm from two distinct
persons, while cloning is more akin to replication or manufacturing).
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human cloning will be decided.
There are no Supreme Court decisions and few federal or state
court cases involving assisted reproductive technologies. 82 While
not directly holding that these procedures are protected under
the procreative right, the majority of the cases discuss the
procedures in the context of having this protection.83 One district
court case, Lifchez v. Hartigan,84 explicitly stated that embryo
transfer and chorionic villi sampling both "fall within a woman's
zone of privacy as recognized in Roe v. Wade, Carey v. Population
Services International, and their progeny [...I It takes no great
leap of logic to see that within the cluster of constitutionally
protected choices that includes the right to have access to
contraceptives, there must be included within that cluster the
right to submit to a medical procedure that may bring about,
rather than prevent, pregnancy."85 The court, in essence,
recognized that the choice of how to procreate is included within
the constitutionally protected zone of privacy from which the
right to procreate developed.86
Many other courts and legal commentators just assume that
82 See, e.g., Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 2001) (Silverman, J.,
dissenting) (finding law denying inmate from artificially inseminating his wife and
violative of his fundamental right to procreate); C.K v. N. J. Dep't. of Health & Human
Serv., 92 F.3d 171, 194-95 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding government aid program deterring
childbirth did not violate plaintiffs' procreative rights because government has no
obligation to subsidize reproductive choice); Kimberly Horvath, Does Bragdon v. Abbott
Provide the Missing Link for Infertile Couples Seeking Protection Under the ADA? 2
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 819, 819 (1999) (discussing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624
(1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) decision reproduction is major life activity under
Americans with Disabilities Act, may help infertile couples find treatment).
83 See Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 523 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (noting abortion regulation statute did not prohibit in vitro fertilization);
Debra Feuerberg Duffy, To Be or Not To Be: Legal Ramifications of the Cloning of Human
Embryos, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 189, 209 (1995) (discussing court's
interpretation of Ililinios' Abortion Law in Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir.
1986) did not prohibit in vitro fertilization).
84 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990) affd, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990).
85 See id. at 1377 (finding if there is no compelling state interest sufficient to prevent
women from terminating pregnancy during first trimester there can be no such interest
sufficient to intrude upon other protected activities during first trimester); see also Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (noting government may not
regulate during first trimester of pregnancy); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462
U.S. 416, 450 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating there is no legitimate state
interest served by imposing twenty-four hour waiting period before abortion can be
performed).
86 See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483 (1965) (discussing several rights included
in penumbra of right to privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(recognizing fundamental right to procreation); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 458, 453
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing privacy as individual right regardless of
marital status).
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assisted reproductive technologies are protected under the right
to procreate, without detailed analysis. The New Jersey
Supreme Court, in the famous case involving a surrogacy
contract, In re Matter of Baby M,87 noted that [tihe right to
procreate very simply is the right to have natural children,
whether through sexual intercourse or artificial insemination. 88
Courts do not generally dictate what means of procreation are
or are not acceptable.8 9  An interference with the decision
whether or not to procreate, including how the procreation
should occur, would be an infringement on the right to privacy.90
To arbitrarily prevent an individual from cloning would serve to
prevent a means of procreation, and accordingly, would be
unconstitutional. 91
However, it is ultimately unclear whether courts will
determine that human cloning should receive the same
protection as natural procreation through sexual intercourse.
There is a strong argument that it will, however, based on the
refusal of courts to interfere with decisions regarding
procreation, and the general notion that assisted reproductive
technologies are protected.
Assuming courts reach the conclusion that human cloning is
constitutionally protected by the right to procreate, this right is
not absolute. The question arises whether there are
87 109 N.J. 396 (N.J. 1988).
88 See id. at 448 (holding surrogacy contract invalid and refusing to terminate
parental rights of natural mother). See generally Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538-39 (recognizing
individual fundamental right to make decisions concerning procreation); Griswold, 381
U.S. at 479 (focusing on right to choose not to procreate).
89 See Kristin L. Antall, Who Is My Mother9 " Why States Should Ban Posthumous
Reproduction By Women, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 203, 224 (1999) (stating Supreme Court
established fundamental right to procreate, but permissible means and methods have not
been decided); see also Stephanie F. Schultz, Surrogacy Arrangements: Who Are the
"Parents" of a Child Born Through Artificial Reproductive Techniques? 22 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 273, 277 (1995) (stating courts have not defined permissible methods of procreation).
See generally Gary N. Skoloff, Introduction to Special Issues on Surrogacy, 22 FAM. L.Q.
119 (1988) (discussing competing rights of participants within surrogacy arrangement).
90 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538-39 (holding individuals have fundamental right to
make decisions about procreation); see also Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 ("If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision to bear or beget a child."). See generally Griswald, 381 U.S. at 482
(discussing several rights included in penumbra of right to privacy).
91 See Antall, supra note 89, at 224 (arguing "the fact that couple needs assistance
when reproducing does not lessen their fundamental right in any way"); see also Skinner,
316 U.S. at 541 (stating strict scrutiny must be applied to fundamental right); Hong,
supra note 78, at 743 (describing human cloning as reproductive method).
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circumstances that would allow the government to restrict this
right. An analysis of the possible compelling state interests
involved in preventing human cloning for procreative purposes, is
therefore necessary.
VI. STATE INTERESTS IN BANNING HUMAN CLONING TO CREATE
FAMILIES
The government may not arbitrarily take away rights that are
protected by the Constitution.92  There are some limited
situations, however, where the government may restrict or
prohibit such rights. Any law that prevents an individual from
enjoying his or her fundamental rights as protected by the
Constitution, must pass the strict scrutiny test, the highest
standard of review. 93 The test provides that the law must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.94
The Supreme Court in Skinner v. State of Oklahoma,95 specified
that the strict scrutiny test must be used when a law affects an
individual's fundamental right to procreate. 96  This test is
necessary to balance the interests of the government against the
constitutional rights of the individual.
92 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (discussing written constitutions
and stating that "an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void"); see also
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964) (stating governmental purposes to control
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broad and thereby invade areas of protected freedoms);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (holding governmental regulations
must not unduly infringe protected freedoms).
93 The origin of the strict scrutiny standard is generally credited to Justice Stone's
famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
Justice Stone stated, "There may be narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
Amendments." Id. He suggested that restrictive legislation may be "subjected to more
exacting judicial scrutiny.., than are most other types of legislation." Id.
94 See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 427 (2000) (Thomas, J.
dissenting) (stating strict scrutiny requires law be narrowly tailored to compelling
governmental interest); Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56 (stating laws may limit fundamental
rights only if they serve compelling state interest and are narrowly drawn to express that
interest); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (applying strict scrutiny to fundamental right).
95 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
96 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (stating strict scrutiny classification that states make
in sterilization law is essential); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56 (1973) (stating laws may
limit fundamental rights only if they serve compelling state interest and are narrowly
drawn to express that interest); John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology
and the Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 915 (1996) (acknowledging procreative rights can
be limited when it cause harm but heavy burdens of justification are placed upon those
who would restrict them).
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There are several governmental interests that may be
considered sufficiently compelling to override an individual's
fundamental right to procreate. 97 There are concerns about the
welfare of the clone and protection of human life.98 The
possibility of mutation, the psychological impact, and the use of a
clone for spare body parts all raise questions concerning the
individual rights and autonomy of the person that would be
produced. 99 Others raise objections to human cloning because it
threatens individuality and genetic diversity.o00  One
commentator examines morality as a possible state interest. 01
Human cloning raises the disturbing possibility of eugenics. 02
Some might be tempted to choose characteristics of the clone that
are considered desirable.103 If the resulting child did not live up
97 See Sophia Kolehmainen, Human Cloning- Brave New Mistake, 27 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 557, 560-63 (1999) (discussing concerns that human cloning raises); see also
Charlene Kalebic, The Constitutional Question of Cloning Humans: Duplication or
Procreation? An Examination of the Constitutional Right to Procreate, 8 S. CAL.
INTERDIs. L.J. 229, 249 (1998) (arguing state interests are compelling and override
individual procreative interests).
98 See supra note 38, at 94-95 (1998) (describing cloning technologies as "physically
risky to offspring").
99 See Vernon J. Ehlers, The Case Against Human Cloning, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 523,
526 (1999) (quoting Dr. Ian Wilmut, chief researcher for Dolly experiment, "[tihe one who
is truly affected by cloning is the child. The child is the one who is most vulnerable in this
technology"); Debra L. Moore, Don't Rush to Judgment on "Dolly'" Human Cloning and its
Individual Procreative Liberty Implications, 66 UMKC L. REV. 425, 436-42 (1997)
(discussing various harms that human cloning may create).
100 See Leon R. Kass, Why We Should Ban the Cloning of Human Beings, 4 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 41, 43 (1999) (offering reasons to ban human cloning for procreative purposes);
Kolehmainen, supra note 97, at 560-63 (discussing concerns that human cloning raises);
Erice A. Posner & Richard A. Posner, The Demand for Human Cloning, 27 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 579, 595-96 (1999) (speculating on possible long term loss of genetic diversity in
human species as parents clone more desirable children); see also Daniel Callahan, A
Step Too Far, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1997, at 23 (explaining how cloning upsets balance
between forces; parents verses their child's individuality).
101 See Moore, supra note 99, at 436-42 (suggesting courts may find morality to be
legitimate state interest in light of Bowers v. Hardwick); see also Human Cloning.
Position Paper of the Catholic Medical Association, 15 ISSUES L. & MED. 323, 323-24
(2000) (stating Catholic Medical Association's views of human cloning as contrary to
natural moral law). See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)
(validating sodomy law as based on notions of morality).
102 See Kalebic, supra note 97, at 232 (indicating that eugenics and mass cloning are
significant concerns);
Kolehmainen, supra note 97, at 560-63 (raising eugenics as reason to ban human cloning);
see also Leon R. Kass, Triumph or Tragedy, the Moral Meaning of Genetic Technology, 45
AM. J. JURIs. 1, 1-2 (2000) (articulating concerns which new genetic technology raises,
including eugenics).
103 See Kolehmainen, supra note 97, at 560-63 (stating that people could create clones
to be "taller, blonder, smarter"); Posner & Posner, supra note 100, at 607-08 (debating
real possibility wealthy members of society creating genetically superior offspring while
poor have normal children). But see Stephen J. Gould, Message from a Mouse, TIME, Sept.
13, 1999, at 62 (questioning whether smartness gene would in reality make any difference
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to the expectations of the parents, considerable psychological
problems might occur. 104
The notion of eugenics also raises the possibility of a master
race being created. There is an existing fear that allowing
human cloning would provide the ability to create such a race or
result in mass cloning.105 Supporters of human cloning criticize
these views as being far-fetched and speculative.10 6 These fears,
however, have a legitimate potential of turning into reality, as
history proves. 107 Allowing unrestricted human cloning would
place great power in the hands of many people. To think that the
entire population will wield this power in a responsible manner,
underestimates the potential problems.
"[MIost people are repelled by all aspects of human cloning: the
possibility of mass production of human beings with large
numbers of look-alikes, compromised in their individuality; the
idea of father-son or mother-daughter twins; the bizarre prospect
of a woman bearing and rearing a genetic copy of herself, her
spouse, or even her deceased father or mother; the grotesqueness
over education and environment).
104 See Callahan, supra note 100, at 23 (explaining cloning upsets balance between
forces, parents and child's individuality which influence child); Elliot N. Dorff, Human
Cloning. A Jewish Perspective, 8 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L. J. 117, 120 (1998) (stating that
cloning will likely exacerbate psychological problems children and parents already have,
bringing new meaning to parent saying "'I got A's in school; you should too!'); Moore,
supra note 99, at 436-42 (stating that "because the potential [psychological] harms could
prove devastating to the human clone, they must be accounted for in an interest balancing
test").
105 See John R. Harding, Jr., Beyond Abortion: Human Genetics and the New
Eugenics, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 471, 471 (1991) (stating "history provides horrific examples of
despots who would abuse the eugenic power of genetic
engineering to create a master race"). See generally GOTZ ALY, PERER CHROUST, &
CHRISTIAN PROSS, CLEANSING THE FATHERLAND: NAZI MEDICINE AND RACIAL HYGIENE 23,
23-24 (The Johns Hopkins University Press 1987) (describing Nazi Germany's attempt to
create master race through eugenics and disturbing experiments performed on prisoners
to that end); L.A. TIMES, France's Chirac to Seek Ban on Human Cloning, April 30, 1997,
at A13 (calling for world wide ban on human cloning).
106 See Katz, supra note 1, at 1 (1997) (recognizing many supporters of human cloning
who believe benefits will outweigh any negative aspects); John A- Robertson, Liberty,
Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1371, 1385 (1998) (describing human
cloning as providing "fertile arena for fantasies about exercising a despotic or narcissistic
power over others," but conceding that "with the eugenics movement in the United States
and Germany hovering in recent memory, one could not be sure that the worst uses of
cloning would not occur").
107 See Harding, Jr., supra note 105, at 471 (stating "history provides horrific
examples of despots who would abuse eugenic power of genetic engineering to create a
master race"); ALY, CHROUST, & PROSS, supra note 105 (describing Nazi Germany's
attempt to create master race through eugenics and disturbing experiments performed on
prisoners to that end); Robertson, supra note 106 (recounting eugenics movements in
Germany as grim reminder of evils which may occur).
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of conceiving a child as an exact replacement for another who has
died; the utilitarian creation of embryonic duplicates of oneself,
to be frozen away or created when needed to provide homologous
tissues or organs for transplantation; the narcissism of those who
would clone themselves and the arrogance of others who think
they know who deserves to be cloned; the Frankensteinian hubris
to create human life and increasingly to control its destiny; men
playing God. [...] [Wie sense that cloning is a radical form of
child abuse."108
Though there may be a constitutionally protected right to
clone, following a procreative liberty analysis, many state
interests exist that could prevent human cloning as a form of
procreation. Probably the most convincing reason for enacting a
ban, is the potential abuse of the power that human cloning
would offer through eugenics. A total ban on all human cloning
and human cloning research might not be sufficiently narrow to
pass the strict scrutiny test.109 A ban would have to clearly state
that it does not include the prohibition of human cloning for
purely scientific or medical research."10 If it is clear that the ban
is only directed at preventing human cloning by individuals as a
means of procreation, it would most likely sustain strict scrutiny.
Such a ban serves compelling state interests that override the
fundamental right to procreate.'11
108 See Kass, supra note 100, at 43.
109 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56 (stating laws may limit fundamental rights only if
they serve compelling
state interest and are narrowly drawn to express that interest); Robertson, supra note 96,
at 915 (acknowledging procreative right "can be limited when it causes great harm... but
a heavy burden of justification is placed upon those who would restrict them"); see also
Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy Process:
Developing an Equal'ty Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J. L. & MED. 455
n.89 (1999) (stating argument can be made that fundamental right to procreate should
apply equally to coital and noncoital reproduction).
110 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.36.2 (West 1999) (prohibiting human cloning,
but excluding scientific research and cell based therapy); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.430(a) (West 1999) (banning human cloning except for scientific research and cell
based therapies); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-16.4-2 (1999) (prohibiting human cloning for
purpose of creating humans).
111 See Kalebic, supra note 97, at 249 (arguing state interests are compelling and
override individual procreative
interests). But see Cameron v. Board of Ed., 795 F.Supp. 228, 237 (S.D.Ohio 1991)
(extending constitutional privacy right to artificial insemination); Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735
F.Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D.IUl. 1990) (extending procreative rights to embryo transfer and
chrionic villi sampling), cert. deniedScholberg v. Lifcherz, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Since the birth of Dolly, there has been a movement to ban
human cloning and prevent any further research in this area.
Setting aside ethical principles, the legal question arises as to
whether the banning of human cloning would violate the
fundamental right to have children. The government may not
interfere with a person's decision to procreate or have a family,
as this would violate the individual's privacy rights. An
arbitrary prevention of procreation would infringe on the right to
procreate, and this would be a violation of the Constitution.
There are, however, potential disastrous effects of human
cloning that must be considered. The psychological ramifications
are likely to be seriously damaging. The idea of commodification
of children has severe consequences, as well. For now, a total
ban on human cloning and human cloning research, without
more information, should not be enforced. There are possible
medical advances and benefits that might derive from such
research. The courts should proceed with appropriate discretion
and take into consideration the profound implications and effects
that are involved. If a statute banning human cloning as a form
of procreation is narrowly tailored, it will probably withstand
strict scrutiny analysis, as there are compelling governmental
interests that transcend procreative liberty interests.
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